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Assessing the Importance of Oligopsony Power in Agricultural Markets (Michael
L. Cook, University of Missouri, presiding)

Assessing the Importance of Oligopsony
Power in Agricultural Markets
Richard T. Rogers and Richard J. Sexton
Oligopoly, competition among few sellers, is the
cornerstone of industrial organization (IO). Conversely, its sister concept, oligopsony, competi-

exercise of oligopsony power even in geographic
settings where relatively few buyers prevail.

tion among few buyers, is scarcely mentioned.
For example, oligopsony is not discussed in the

however, to first-handler markets for the raw agri-

entire two volume Handbook of Industrial Organization, and monopsony is mentioned only in the
context of incentives to integrate vertically.

Two reasons apparently account for IO economists' lack of interest in buyer market power: (i)
they don't think it's very important, and (ii) they
don't believe it presents any unique modeling issues relative to seller market power. Scherer and
Ross illustrate this first viewpoint, arguing that

"average concentration on the buyers' side in
manufacturing is undoubtedly lower than seller
concentration" (p. 519). Tirole, in his masterful
treatise on IO theory, illustrates the second, dispatching monopsony power in one sentence:
"Naturally the conclusions [regarding monopoly
power] would also hold as well for monopsony
power..." (p. 65).
We argue that this dismissive treatment of
buyer market power is not reasonable for economists interested in agriculture and agricultural
markets. The Scherer and Ross viewpoint may apply when considering generic inputs such as labor, capital, and energy. Competition for these inputs is apt to exceed competition for the outputs
they produce because firms cross product market
boundaries to compete for these inputs, and there
is essentially no "branding" among input buyers
to diminish price competition among them. Moreover, these inputs are typically mobile, hence, in

elastic supply to individual buyers, limiting the

This view of input markets does not apply,

cultural commodities that are inputs into the pro-

cessed or fresh-packed food products.' We identify the following distinctive structural character-

istics of these markets:

Cl: The products are often bulky and/or perishable, causing shipping costs to be high, restricting the products' geographic mobility, and

limiting farmers' access to only those buyers
located close to the production site.
C2: Processors' needs for agricultural products
are highly specialized. Other inputs cannot normally be substituted for a given farm product,

nor can the given farm product substitute

readily for agricultural product inputs in alternative production processes.

C3: Farmers are specialized to the supply of
particular commodities through extensive investments in sunk assets. These assets represent
exit barriers for farmers and cause raw product
supply to be inelastic.
C4: Marketing cooperatives or bargaining

associations, institutions of seller power, are
present or potentially present in the market.

Analyses of market power must begin with

definitions of the relevant markets. Cl and C2 are

crucial to defining input markets for agricultural

products. Collectively, they assert that the relevant markets for raw agricultural products will
typically be narrower with respect to both product
class and geography than the markets for the fin-

ished products they produce. Thus, Cl and C2

contradict the general Scherer and Ross proposi-

tion that buyer concentration will be less than
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seller concentration. High
concentration
most of buyer
the public data
available to study food in

the relevant market processing.2
coupled
inelastic
sup
Thewith
data for the
fifty-three food
ply of the farm commodity
(C3)identified
jointly
const
and tobacco industries
by four-digit
SIC code in the 1987
Census show that most
in- buyer
tute compelling structural
evidence
of
market power.
dustries have experienced decreasing firm numThe prototype agricultural
market
characterbers and increasing
seller concentration
over
time. In total, the
sector lost 11,000
firms, leavistics also call into question
Tirole's
assessmen
that monopsony power
can
be by
analyzed
ing just
over 16,000
1987. Moreover, readil
the
using the tools of monopoly
analysis.
sector's largest 100power
firms accounted
for twoof itscostly
value added. Even
without ad- transFor example, markets thirds
with
product
port (Cl) are by definition
spatial
markets.
Yet
justing for proper
market definitions,
the
the classic IO models data
ignore
indicate that the
sellers tospatial
the processing dimen
industries now faceof
fewer countervailing
and more dominant
sion. Also, the institutions
firms.
power (C4) that are endemic
to agriculture ar
largely absent from other sectors of the
Most of the fifty-three food and tobacco

industries contained in the Census do not deeconomy. In fact, without the protection afforded
exclusively to farmer organizations through the fine relevant input markets because (a) input

Capper-Volstead Act, coalitions of sellers repremarkets are often local or regional in geosent a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
graphic scope (Cl), and (b) the four-digit in-

These factors combine to generate the keydustry categories are too broad (C2). Table 1,
premises of this paper. First, buyer market part of a special Census tabulation, addresses
power is a significant issue in many first-hanthis first problem for nine industries by movdler markets. Second, understanding buyer mar-ing to the SIC five-digit product class data or
even to more narrow classifications. The avket power in agriculture requires use of models
that incorporate the unique structural character-erage four-digit four-firm concentration raistics of agricultural markets rather than modelstion (CR4) is 37.8, and four of the nine inadapted routinely from the analysis of sellerdustries have CR4 ? 30. However, their fivemarket power. We pursue these themes in theand seven-digit classifications have an average CR4 of 61.3, with twenty-four of the
subsequent two sections of the paper.
thirty-eight national product markets having
CR4 2 50, a commonly used benchmark for
separating markets into workable competiEvidence on Buyer Concentration in Food
tion and noncompetitive groups.
Markets
Consider, for example, the meat and poultry in-

Thirty-four years ago in a similar forum,

dustries. Plants in these product categories are

Lanzillotti concluded from data assembled for

highly specialized and, even though the finished
products may be good substitutes, the raw agrififty-one farm-related industries that "farmers,
cultural products are not substitutes into producas sellers, have found themselves at the mercy

tion.
of oligopsonies, collusion, and monopsony"
(p.In these cases the five-digit product class
datareprovide a basis for meaningful assessments
1240). Two great merger waves have since
of the
shaped the U.S. economy. Although trends
in input market structure. Similar conclusions
for the flour and other grain mills and vegfarm production include decreasing farmhold
numetable oil mills categories. Table 1 documents
bers and increasing farm size, the imbalance

between the number and size distribution of

that, generally, the number of firms and plants

falls
and CR4 rises when one moves from indusfarmers and that of the firms they sell to
has
try data (four-digit) to product class data (five or
worsened since 1960. In this section we provide

more
an updated view of structure in the food and
to- digits). In canned fruits, the relevant input

markets are often so narrow that the seven-digit
bacco processing industries.
level
Buyer concentration is difficult to assess
be-of detail is necessary to attain the proper
market
cause there are no statistical series analogous
to definition. To illustrate, note that, al-

the abundant data available on seller concentra-

though eighty-one firms canned fruits in 1987,

only five and eleven processed cranberries and oltion. The Census of Manufacturing provides
ives, respectively. Thus, whereas canned fruits
2 We focus on market structure in food processing in this sec- may represent a relevant output market class, it is
tion. Relevant market structure data on fresh market sales are pracfar too broad for analysis of competition in the
tically nonexistent. However, oligopsony power issues may be im-

raw
portant in this market due to increasing consolidation among the

grocery retailers, the major buyers of food for fresh market sales.

product markets because the vast majority of
fruit processors do not compete, for example, for
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Table 1. Selected SICs to Highlight Increased Concentration of Input Markets, 1

All Companies Top 100 Co-ops
SIC Name Co Est VS CR4 Co-op Est VS Share
2011 Meat packing plant products 1328 1434 41227 39 1 2 0.1
20111 Beef, not canned or made into sausage 218 265 21684 58 0 0 0.0
20112 Veal, not canned or made into sausage 52 53 379 64 0 0 0.0

20113 Lamb and mutton, not canned or 38 51 380 73 0 0 0.0
made into sausage
20114 Pork, fresh and frozen 132 161 8,406 38 0 0 0.0

2015 Poultry and egg processing 284 463 14,371 29 3 16 5.0
20151 Young chickens 72 161 7,452 42 2 12 7.1
20153 Turkeys, incl. frozen, whole and parts 41 57 1,645 38 1 3 2.5
20159 Liquid, dried and frozen eggs 39 47 495 41 0 0 0.0
2033 Canned fruits and vegetables 462 647 12,244 28 26 63 13.7
20331 Canned fruits, except baby foods 81 120 2,085 49 9 25 38.6
2033128 Canned cranberries and sauce 5 10 107 >96 1 6 (D)
2033136 Canned olives, incl. stuffed 11 11 280 87 3 3 56.5
2033190 Other canned fruits, 69 101 1,698 55 6 16 32.5
excl. olives, cranberries

20332 Canned vegetables, except hominy 99 214 2,298 42 3 10 8.8
and mushrooms

20333 Canned hominy and mushrooms 21 26 166 66 1 1 1.5
20335 Canned vegetable juices 37 49 310 78 3 4 18.8
20336 Catsup and other tomato sauces, pastes, etc. 94 148 3,024 55 1 6 5.0
20338 Jams, jellies, and preserves 55 77 664 57 4 7 10.6
2033A Canned fruit juices, nectars, and concentrates 95 133 2,344 48 9 18 14.4

2033B Fresh fruit juices and nectars, single strength 188 295 951 35 14 25 16.3
20866 Noncarbonated soft drinks, including 286 504 2,427 54 15 40 32.8
fruit drinks

2034 Dehydrated fruits, vegetables, and soups 107 132 2,079 37 3 4 14.2
20343 Dried and dehydrated fruits and vegetables 52 82 1,544 41 3 4 19.1
2034313 Raisins 11 13 334 80 1 1 (D)
2034315 Prunes 10 24 265 88 1 1 (D)
2034330 Dehydrated potatoes 8 11 173 90 0 0 0.0
2035 Pickles, sauces, and salad dressings 344 382 4,479 40 3 3 1.8
20352 Pickles and other pickled products 78 102 1,000 48 0 0 0.0
2037 Frozen fruits and vegetables 194 258 6,254 30 7 13 8.4
20371 Frozen fruits, juices, ades, drinks, cocktails 89 114 2,482 41 6 10 13.3
20372 Frozen vegetables 86 147 3,645 42 3 9 5.4
2037248 French-fried potatoes, incl. other potatoes 31 50 1,853 77 1 1 (D)
2037290 Other frozen vegetables 69 110 1,792 27 2 8 (D)
2041 Flour and other grain mill products 237 358 4,690 44 1 1 1.0
20411 Wheat flour, except flour mixes 75 185 3,219 54 1 1 1.4
20413 Corn mill products 55 98 561 59 0 0 0.0
2076 Vegetable oil mill products, n.e.c. 20 23 490 70 3 3 4.3
20761

Linseed

oil

6

7

105

98

1

1

15.0

20762 Vegetable oils 29 39 218 67 2 2 1.4
2099 Food preparations, n.e.c. 1,510 1,658 10,671 23 7 12 0.6

2099761 Dried, dehydrated potatoes, 8 11 (D) 99 0 0 0.0
packed w/other ingred.

2099771 Head rice packaged w/other ingredients 12 17 225 91 2 4 (D)
2099921 Perishable prepared salads 84 86 359 46 1 1 (D)

2099935 Vegetables, peeled or cut for the trade 22 25 78 61 0 0 0.0
2099F Peanut butter 41 48 848 70 1 1 0.6
2099G25 Honey, blended and churned 14 16 79 74 0 0 0.0

Note: Co = number of companies; Est = number of establishments; VS = value of shipm
was less than 5, the VS Share was estimated if possible, else (D); (D) = Census cannot d
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olives or for cranberries.
Modeling

Oligopsony in Agricultural
The problem of using
MarketsCensus data to make
inferences about local/regional markets is even
Not surprisingly,
the data
limitations
we have
more vexing. The national
data
will
typically
described
havethe
limitedrelevant
the scope for empirical
represent lower bounds
on
geostudy
of oligopsony power in agriculture,
graphic input market
concentration.3
Two explacing aproblem.
premium on theoretical
modamples illustrate the thereby
general
In 1987
eling as a and
guide totwenty-four
understanding the dimentwenty sweet corn canners
frosions and potential
significancewith
of the problem.
zen sweet corn processors
operated
proIn this section
we develop
a prototype
model of
duction scattered across
much
of the
country
oligopsony
competition
in agricultural markets,
contributing collectively
to
a relatively
uncon
explore
its implications,sweet
and discuss extensions
centrated market for
processed
corn.
of the
basic product
model. Consistent
with themarprior
However, the relevant
raw
input
discussion, the model incorporates
the impacts
kets may be highly concentrated,
given the
geoof (a) concentrated
market structures,
costly
graphic immobility of
raw sweet
corn (b)
(Jesse
product seventy-two
transportation, and (c) potential
nonand Johnson). Similarly
broiler
competitive
conduct
among
processor/handlers.
processors operated in
1987
with
CR4
= 42.
We illustrate
how these market conditions inter- in th
These firms are located
predominantly

"broiler belt" that stretches from the

act to determine the farm-retail price spread.

The basic
model involves production and sale
Midatlantic to eastern Texas. Shipping
of reof a single
product,
r. Producers are assumed to
frigerated and "super chilled" chickens
has
albe arrayed
uniformly along a line of unit length.
lowed the output market to continually
enlarge
the sake of
mathematical tractability, an indiin geographic scope, but the inputFor
markets
revidual
farmer'sa function for supplying r is asmain local, often a fifty-mile radius
around
sumed to impobe linear: r = (1 / b)w, where w is the
processor. The Census data are relatively
price received by the farmer.4 Under a system
tent to overcome the problem of net
geographic
market definition. Data available at the state
of free-on-board (FOB) pricing w = W - tU,
level are limited to the four-digit levelwhere
and W is the processor's "mill" price, t is the
shipping cost per unit distance, and U is the disgive only establishment counts, employment,
and sales data. In the more concentrated in-

tance from farm to processor.
Processors are assumed to convert raw product

dustries even this information is withheld for

into the processed product q according to the
confidentiality reasons.
quasi-fixed production function q = min{R / X,
Cooperatives are directly relevant to market

h(Z) }, where R is the aggregate raw product volconduct in agriculture because they enable their
members to integrate around oligopsony ume
pro-procured by the processor, Z is a vector of
processing inputs, and k = R / q is the fixed concessors. They may also influence oligopsonists'
version rate between raw and processed product.
behavior by acting as "yardsticks of competiThis function incorporates the notion of limited
tion," an issue addressed in the next section.
For the 100 largest marketing cooperatives, substitution between farm and processing inputs
table 1 lists the number of co-ops and establish- expressed in C2. Without loss of generality, we can
set k = 1.0 through choice of measurement units.
ments in the product-class categories and their

Firm market areas do not overlap under FOB

combined market shares. The co-op share is

positively related to the importance of the agri-pricing, and, thus, supply to a processor is
cultural input in the production process andfound by integrating over his market radius, L

negatively related to the industry's ratio of
value added to shipments. Much of coopera-

tives' involvement in food marketing is missed,

L

(1) R = 2JrdU

however, when only food processing industries
are examined because cooperatives have a major presence in the first-handler markets that
are classified outside of food processing.

0

1
0

=
b

L

2
b

-

3 Differences between concentration in national markets and lo-

cal input markets will be minimized if companies operate estab4 This function derives from a Cobb-Douglas technology of the

lishments in each local market. Table 1 demonstrates, however,

form r = AXo05sy5, where X and Y are inputs and A is a constant. We

consider the short-run case where Y is fixed at the level Y = Y".
that this tends not to be the case. For the nine four-digit industries
Then,
depicted in the table, the ratio of establishments to companies
is from producer profit maximization it follows that (1 / b) =
only 1.20.
A2Y" I2v, where v is the price of the variable input X.
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The cost function associated with
the processors
productween
is then 1 / n. Given
tion function for q is c(R) = W(R)R
+ m(R)the
+ f, equation defining t
fication,
boundary between a representativ
where R = q is the total volume processed,
W(R) is, from (1), the inverse supply function and its rival is the condition of equ
facing the processor, m(R) is the cost associated prices W - tL = W* - t[(1 / n) - L],
with the processing inputs Z, and f > 0 repre- the mill price of an adjacent rival. So
sents a fixed cost. It will be convenient to as-

and differentiating with respect to W
sume processors operate with constant marginal
costs and, hence, that m(R) = mR. Furthermore,

to focus on issues of oligopsony power, we (4)
as-

L W -n) W*
+ - -,
2t

sume that processors are perfect competitors in

the sale of q and take output price P as given.
We define a price level P = Po and scale money
units so that Po - m = 1.0. A processor's profit

function is thus

dL

dW*

1

a

=1 - - - =

dW (I dW) 2t 2t

Here a = 1 - (dW* / dW) speci
duct. Under competitive Bertra
havior dW* / dW = 0 and a = 1, whereas under

(2) 7r(R) = (1 - W)R(W) -f.

The first-order condition for maximizing (2)collusive/Loschian behavior dW* / dW = 1 and a
can be expressed as follows (see Sexton):
= 0. Thus, it is convenient to consider a to lie in

the unit interval, a E [0, 1], with higher values of
a denoting increasingly less competitive conduct.

I - W 1

The index a may be interpreted in "conjectural

(3) Q( -W n

variations" parlance, but, more generically, it can

dR W aR W R L dL W
=

-

-+

dW R aW R L R dW L

be treated simply as an index of processor con-

duct.

Given the specification for dL / dW in (4), the
remaining steps in formulating the relative price
Equation (3) expresses the appealing
notion
spread in (3) involve
specifications for the partial

that the spatial competitor must
consider
derivatives,
JR / JW both
and JR / aL. The first expres-

the direct effect of its price change
on producer
sion is obtained
simply by differentiating the supsupply, aR / 3W, and the indirect
effect
its
ply function
(1): aRon
/ aW
= 2L / b, and the second
market area based on rivals' expression
reactions,
aR /
is obtained
by noting that the gain in
aL(dL / dW). The relative farm-retail
price
supply from expanding
market area is simply the
spread, 0, provides a convenient
metric
of
peramounts supplied by the
farmers at either border:
formance in the raw product JR
market.
/ JL = (2 /Its
b)(Wlower
- tL). Setting L = 1 / 2n and

bound is zero under competitive
behavior
and expressions into (3)
substituting
these various
for the model considered here
itsa upper
bound
yields
reduced-form
expression for the relative
under pure monopsony is 1.0.farm-retail
Thus, (F(e
[0, 1].
price spread
as a function of the marWe model a short-run industry
equilibrium
ket concentration
measured by n 2 1, processor
where the number, n, of processors
the marconductin
measured
by a [0, 1], and the spatial
dimension
of the market
ket area is given. Moreover, we
assume
thatmeasured
the in terms of t
processors are symmetric and are arrayed equi1-wbedistantly along the unit interval.5 Distance

(5) ((t, n, a) =

2na - ta - 4 + 2nj(a2 /t2)(1 - t / n)) + (1/2n)(a2 - 4a + 16)]

2na + t[a - 4 + 2nV((a2 / t2)(1 - t / n)) + (1 / 2n)(a2 - 4c + 16)]
5 Processors' locations, once chosen, are fixed. Equal separation

among processors minimizes the total cost of transporting a givenBecause
vol-

ume of raw product. We do not invoke a long-run equilibrium as-

complex,
sumption of zero profit and treat n as endogenous (e.g., Beckman
and
Capozza and Van Order) for two reasons. First, profits are driven
to
behavior
zero by free entry, which most analysts agree does not hold generally
values
of
in food processing. Second, treating n as exogenous enables us to il-

the expression for (F in (5) is rather
it is convenient to simulate the
of the price spread for alternative
t, n, and Ca. To determine reasonable

lustrate how concentrated market structures interact with firm conduct

bounds for t, consider that total farm-to-

and spatial market parameters to influence the farm-retail price spread.

processor shipping costs, tU, in the range of
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Figure 1. Farm-retail price spreads for alternative forms of market behavior

25% of raw product value are not uncommon among processors, where (x = 0 and, hence dL /
(Durham and Sexton). Using the competitive dW = 0. In this case each firm acts as a

mill price W = 1.0, this benchmark yields a monopsonist within its market area. Higher

maximum t = t* based on the formula t* / 2n =

portation costs reduce the price spread
0.25W = 0.25, or t*(n) = 0.5n, where U = 1 /Loschian
2n
competition because they dim
defines the longest haul, given n.

farmers' net price, W- tU, causing supply

sents the case of Loschian or collusive behavior

areas for each buyer, thereby mitigating t

Figures la-Ic summarize the results for valthe processor to become more elastic and p
ues of t e [0, t*] (e.g., t* = 1.0 implies haulage
sors to react by raising W. Conversely, inc
costs of 0.25 for the boundary producer, given
the number of buyers n increases the relativ
n = 2) and n = 1, 2, 3, 5, 10. Figure la repregin because more buyers cause smaller m
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for-profit
fect transportation costs have in increasing
pro- rivals (either Loschian or Bertrand
competitors) versus when one of the rivals is a
cessor prices.6
cooperative. The cooperative's impact on perFigure lb depicts behavior under Bertrand/
formance is especially significant when it reHotelling competition, dW* / dW = 0 and a = 1.
places a Loschian competitor and when transIn nonspatial models this behavior induces the
portation costs are relatively low. High transcompetitive market outcome as reflected in 1(t
portation costs vitiate the competitive impact of
= 0) = 0 for all n. However, costly transportaeven a cooperative rival.
tion and small n interact to produce rather large
relative price spreads even under this form of
aggressive processor competition.7
Figure c depicts D under Cournot behavior,
Conclusions
generally considered to be an appealing alternative to the extremes of Bertrand or Collusive
This paper has argued that markets for raw agricultural products are likely to be structural
behavior. In the Cournot case, the price spread
Concentration in the these firstranges from a low of F(t = 0) = 1/3 for all oligopsonies.
n to
handler markets will often exceed concentraD > 0.5 for small numbers of sellers and high
tion in the affiliated finished product markets.
relative transportation costs.
We developed a simple theoretical model to ilFinally, we extend the basic model to include
lustrate how high buyer concentration, costly
marketing cooperatives operating in conjunctransport, and noncompetitive buyer
tion with ordinary for-profit processors.product
As
table 1 illustrates, this situation is common.
conduct may interact to produce large farm-retail price spreads.
Two market performance implications follow.
First, members of the cooperative do not face The analysis suggests that monopsony/oligopsony issues deserve strong consideration in
oligopsony pricing, as the cooperative seeks to
maximize member welfare. Second, as noted by
food industry policy debates, but to date this
has not been the situation. Even in the meat inSexton, the presence of a cooperative may improve market performance by competing rivals.dustry where consolidation and increased concentration issues have been most dramatic, the
From (4) the rational conjecture of a
courts did not address input market concerns
cooperative's price response to a noncooperative rival's price increase, dW c / dW, is negative
(Purcell). Absent public intervention to prowhenever the cooperative faces an upward
mote competition in raw product markets, farmsloping net average revenue product curve for ers' main opportunities to foster competitive
its members' production. Given f > 0, this con- behavior in their selling markets are through
dition prevails in the present model. Thus from developing means of countervailing power.
(4), a > 1 when facing a cooperative rival, and Given the size disparities between farmers and
a cooperative stimulates even more competitive their buyers, countervailing power must often
market conduct than Bertrand competitors.8
be attained jointly through bargaining associaFigure id illustrates how a cooperative pres- tions or marketing cooperatives. The potency of
ence improves market performance of for-profit even this tool may be diminished, however, by
rivals for the model developed in this section. powerful buyers who, as Innes and Sexton have
The figure is based on n = 3, and evaluates the shown, may be able to "divide-and-conquer"
equilibrium price spread generated by a repre- farmers through discriminatory practices.
sentative firm who competes either with two
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